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Abstract
This paper presents an axiomatic model of decision making which incorporates
objective but imprecise information. We axiomatize a decision criterion of the mul-
tiple priors (or maxmin expected utility) type. The model achieves two primary
objectives. First, it explains how subjective belief varies with information. Second, it
identifies an explicit attitude toward imprecision that underlies usual hedging axioms.
Information is assumed to take the form of a probability-possibility set, that is, a set
P of probability measures on the state space. The decision maker is told that the
true probability law lies in P . She is assumed to rank pairs of the form (P, f) where
P is a probability-possibility set and f is an act mapping states into outcomes. The
representation result delivers multiple-priors utility at each probability-possibility set.
There is a mapping that gives for each probability-possibility set the subjective set
of priors. This allows both subjective expected utility when the subjective set of
priors is reduced to a singleton and the other extreme where the decision maker takes
the worst case scenario in the entire probability-possibility set. We show that the
relation “more averse to imprecision” is characterized by inclusion of the sets of pri-
ors, irrespective of the utility functions that capture risk attitude. We characterize,
under extra axioms, a more precise functional form, in which the subjective set of
priors is obtained by (i) solving for the “mean value” of the probability-possibility set,
and (ii) shrinking the probability-possibility set toward the mean value to a degree
determined by preference.
Keywords: Imprecise information, imprecision aversion, multiple priors, Steiner
point.
JEL Number: D81.
Re´sume´
Nous pre´sentons un mode`le dans lequel le de´cideur a acce`s a` une information objec-
tive impre´cise. Nous axiomatisons une crite`re de de´cision de la famille dite a` “croy-
ances multiples”. Nous caracte´risons une notion d’aversion a` l’impre´cision et donnons
e´galement une caracte´risation de la notion “eˆtre plus adversaire de l’impre´cision”.
Mots Cle´: Information impre´cise, croyances multiples.
JEL Number: D81.
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1 Introduction
In many problems of choice under uncertainty, some information is available to the decision
maker. Yet, this information is often far from being sufficiently precise to allow the decision
maker to come up with an estimate of a probability distribution over the relevant states
of nature. The archetypical example of such a situation is the so-called Ellsberg paradox
(Ellsberg (1961)), in which subjects are given some imprecise information concerning the
composition of an urn and are then asked to choose among various bets on the color of a
ball drawn from that urn.
In this paper, we model a decision maker who reacts to imprecision of the available
data in a given choice problem. We do so assuming that data can be represented by sets of
probability distributions. Our main concern is twofold. First, can we identify an explicit
attitude toward such imprecision and, second, can we establish a relationship between
objective (but imprecise) information and subjective beliefs?
We present an axiomatic model of decision making which incorporates objective but
imprecise information as a variable. The model permits the analyst to relate the choices
made under different information and to apprehend which type of information is valued
by the decision maker. Further, it explains how subjective belief is related to objective
information.
Thus, we define preferences as a binary relationship on the cross product of acts (map-
pings from states of the world to outcomes) and available information (sets of probability
distributions over the state space). Denoting P the set of probability distributions over
the state space that represents the information available to the decision maker (hereafter
probability-possibility sets), preferences bear on couples (P, f) where f is an act in the usual
sense. This means that, at least conceptually, we allow decision makers to compare the
same acts in different informational settings.
The motivation for this formalization can be best understood on Ellsberg’s two urns
example. In urn 1 there is a known proportion of black and white balls (50-50) while in
urn 2, the composition is unknown. The decision maker has the choice to bet on black
in urn 1 or on black in urn 2. Thus, the action (bet on black) itself is the same in the
two cases and the information has changed from a given probability distribution (1/2,1/2)
(urn 1) to the simplex (urn 2). This interpretation can be extended to non experimental
situations. Consider an investor contemplating building an oil platform in either of two
locations: the North sea or the Mexican Gulf. In both cases, the platform is susceptible
to climatic incidents such as storms and the like. One could well argued that probabilistic
information is available in both cases for the immediate future but that over the longer run,
there is a large amount of imprecision as to how climatic change will affect the frequency
and the severity of tropical storms, while there are good reasons to believe that tempest in
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the North Sea will not be affected by climatic change. Then, one can argue that the main
features of the investor’s problem here are comparable to Ellsberg’s two urns. The possible
actions are the same (build or not the platform) at the two locations, but the available
information is different.
We place ourselves in an Anscombe and Aumann (1963) setting, in which outcomes are
probability distributions over a set of prizes. Our general representation theorem axioma-
tizes a class of functionals of the maxmin expected utility type a` la Gilboa and Schmeidler
(1989), where the set of priors is a subset of the available information. Hence, compared
to Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) we enrich the space on which preferences are defined:
in their setting, the (un-modelled) prior information that the decision maker has is fixed.
If we adapt Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) axioms to our setting, we can axiomatize the
following functional form. For two probability-possibility sets P and Q and two acts f and
g, (P, f)  (Q, g) if, and only if,
min
p∈ϕ(P )
∫
u ◦ fdp ≥ min
p∈ϕ(Q)
∫
u ◦ gdp.
The function ϕ takes the probability-possibility set and transforms it into some subjective
set of “beliefs”.
This representation is obtained using Gilboa and Schmeidler’s axiom of uncertainty
aversion which states that mixing two indifferent acts can be strictly preferred to any
of these acts, for hedging reasons. In our setting, we can provide a more direct way of
modeling the decision maker’s attitude toward imprecision, which also provides an easy
way of experimentally testing the axiom. We show in particular that uncertainty aversion
is implied by an axiom of aversion toward imprecision which compares the same act un-
der two different probability-possibility sets. Aversion toward imprecision states, loosely
speaking, that the decision maker always prefers to act in a setting in which he possesses
more information, i.e., the decision maker is averse toward a “garbling” of the available
information. At this stage, we simply remark that the notion we adopt of what it means
for a probability-possibility set to be more imprecise than another one is rather weak and
partial in the sense that it does not enable one to compare many sets (this will be discussed
in Section 3.)
The next step in the paper is to put more discipline on the belief. This is done under an
extra axiom that captures some invariance properties, which will be discussed in Section
4. The subjective set of priors is obtained by (i) solving for the “mean value” of the
probability-possibility set, and (ii) shrinking the probability-possibility set toward the mean
value according to a degree given by preference. The mean value is the Steiner point (see
Schneider (1993)). For polytopes, the Steiner point is the weighted average of extreme
points in which the weight for each is proportional to its outer angle. For cores of beliefs
functions for instance, it coincides with the Shapley value. Denoting s(P ) the Steiner point
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of P , we obtain that ϕ(P ) = (1− ε)s(P ) + θP . This functional form, already suggested in
Ellsberg (1961), consists of taking the convex combination of the minimum expected utility
with respect to all the probability-possibility set, with the expected utility with respect to
a particular probability distribution in this set. The parameter ε is obtained as part of
the representation result and can be interpreted as a (subjective) degree of imprecision
aversion. When ε = 0, we obtain subjective expected utility. When ε = 1 the functional
form expresses the extreme case where the decision maker takes the worst case scenario in
the entire probability-possibility set.
We then proceed to define a notion of comparative imprecision aversion with the feature
that it can be completely separated from risk attitudes. Loosely speaking, we say that a
decision maker b is more imprecision averse than a decision maker a if whenever a prefers to
bet on an event when the information is given by a (precise) probability distribution rather
than some imprecise information, b prefers the bet with the precise information as well.
This notion captures in rather natural terms a preference for precise information, which
does not require the two decision makers that are compared to have the same risk attitudes,
the latter being captured, as we show, by the concavity of the utility function. Our result
states that two decision makers can be compared according to that notion if and only if
the transformed set of one of them is included in the other’s. We also define a notion of
imprecision premium that is consistent with this notion of comparative imprecision aversion
Relationship with the literature
We conclude this introduction by mentioning some related literature, whose precise rela-
tionship with our model and results will be discussed further in the text. We also make
clear what are the main conceptual differences between our approach and much of the
recent literature.
Our model incorporates explicitly information as an object on which the decision maker
has well defined preferences. To the best of our knowledge, Jaffray (1989) is the first to
axiomatize a decision criterion that takes into account “objective information” in a setting
that is more general than risk. In his model, preferences are defined over belief functions.
The criterion he axiomatizes is a weighted sum of the minimum and of the maximum
expected utility. This criterion prevents a decision maker from behaving as an expected
utility maximizer, contrary to ours, which obtains as a limit case the expected utility
criterion. Interest in this approach has been renewed recently, in which object of choices
are sets of lotteries (Ahn (2005), Olszewski (2002), Stinchcombe (2003)). Olszewski (2002)
characterizes, under a weakening of the independence axiom, a version of the α-maxmin
expected utility in which the decision maker puts weights both on the best-case and the
worst-case scenarios. Stinchcombe (2003) characterizes a general class of expected utility
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for sets of lotteries. Ahn (2005) characterizes a conditional subjective expected utility in
which the decision maker has a priori probability over lotteries and updates it according
to each objective set. Our model however does not reduce to one of choice over sets of
lotteries.
More closely related to our analysis is Wang (2003). In his approach the available infor-
mation is explicitly incorporated in the decision model. That information takes the form
of a set of probability distributions together with an anchor, i.e., a probability distribution
that has particular salience. As in our analysis, he assumes that decision makers have
preferences over couples (information,act). However, his axiom of ambiguity aversion is
much stronger than ours and forces the decision maker to be a maximizer of the minimum
expected utility taken over the entire information set. There is no scope in his model for
less extreme attitude towards ambiguity. Following Wang’s approach, Gajdos, Tallon, and
Vergnaud (2004) proposed a weaker version of aversion towards imprecision still assuming
that information was coming as a set of priors together with an anchor. The notion of
aversion toward imprecision that developed in section 3 is based on the one analyzed in
Gajdos, Tallon, and Vergnaud (2004) and is different from the one defined in Gilboa and
Schmeidler (1989) and Schmeidler (1989) and the subsequent literature.
The notion of comparative imprecision aversion could itself be compared to the one
found in Epstein (1999) and Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002). The latter define com-
parative ambiguity aversion using constant acts. They therefore need to control for risk
attitudes in a separate manner and in the end, can compare (with respect to their ambi-
guity attitudes) only decision makers that have the same utility functions.1 Epstein (1999)
uses in place of our bets in the definition of comparative uncertainty aversion, acts that
are measurable with respect to an exogenously defined set of unambiguous events. As a
consequence, in order to be compared, preferences of two decision makers have to coincide
on the set of unambiguous events. If the latter is rich enough, utility functions then co-
incide. Our notion of comparative imprecision aversion, based on the comparison of bets
under precise and imprecise information does not require utility functions to be the same
when comparing two decision makers. Said differently, risk attitudes are simply irrelevant
to the imprecision aversion comparison.
The functional form axiomatized in Section 4 appears in some previous work (Gajdos,
Tallon, and Vergnaud (2004) and Tapking (2004)), based on a rather different set of axioms
and in a more limited setting. Kopylov (2006) also axiomatizes this functional form, for a
fixed information-possibility set. In a setting similar to ours, Giraud (2006) axiomatizes a
model in which the decision maker has non additive second order beliefs.
Finally, we compare our approach with Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukerji (2005). They
1They actually mention that if one wants to compare two decision makers with different utility functions,
one has first to completely elicit them.
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provide a fully subjective model of ambiguity aversion, in which attitude towards ambigu-
ity is captured by a smooth function over the expected utilities associated with a set of
priors. The latter, as in Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) is subjective. Hence, although their
model allows for a flexible and explicit modeling of ambiguity attitudes, there is no link
between the subjective set of priors and the available information. Interestingly, part of
Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukerji (2005)’s motivation is similar to ours, that is disentan-
gling ambiguity attitude from the information the decision maker has. Formally, however,
this separation holds in their model only if one makes the extra assumption that subjective
beliefs coincide with the objective information available. In particular, comparative stat-
ics are more transparent in our model, as information can be exogenously changed. At a
more conceptual level, Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukerji (2005)’s approach assumes that
all uncertainty is eventually reduced to subjective probabilities, although on two different
levels: essentially, the decision maker has in mind a second order probability distribution,
but does not perform reduction of lotteries. The criterion they obtained is smooth and
appeals only to probabilistic tools, which should make it easy to use in economic applica-
tions. Besides the different specific modeling choices, our conceptual departure from their
approach is that we do not assume that, even subjectively, imprecise information can be
reduced to probabilities (even of a second or higher order). In that sense we are more in
line with Ellsberg (2001)’s view, that when a decision maker lacks a determinate proba-
bility distribution over states, “there will correspond [to any available option], in general,
a set of expected utility values, among which he cannot discriminate in terms of definite
probabilities”.
2 Extended multiple-priors model
We start with a benchmark model that extends the multiple-priors model by Gilboa and
Schmeidler (1989) into the variable information setting.
Let Ω = N be the countable set of all the potential states of the world. Let S be the
family of nonempty and finite subsets of Ω. For each S ∈ S, denote the set of probability
measures over S by ∆(S). Let P(S) be the family of compact and convex subset of ∆(S),
where the compactness is defined with regard to the Euclidian space RS. Let P be the
family of probability-possibility sets, that is defined by P = ⋃S∈S P(S). For each P ∈ P ,
its support is denoted by supp(P ).
When told P , the DM is assumed to know only that the true probability lies in P .
When a probability-possibility set is given as a singleton typically denoted by {p}, the DM
knows the true probability precisely and we say there is precise information.
The space of probability-possibility sets P is a mixture space under the operation defined
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by
λP + (1− λ)Q = {λp+ (1− λ)q : p ∈ P, q ∈ Q}.
The set of pure outcomes is denoted by X. Let ∆∗(X) be the set of simple lotteries
(probability measures with finite supports) over X. Let F = {f : Ω→ ∆∗(X)} be the set
of lottery acts. Without loss, any lottery is viewed as a constant act which delivers that
lottery regardless of states.
The domain of objects of choice is P×F . The DM has a preference relation over P×F ,
which is denoted by %. The DM compares pairs of probability-possibility sets and acts.
When
(P, f) % (Q, g),
the DM prefers choosing f under P to choosing g under Q. When Q = P , the preference
relation represents the ranking of acts given the information embodied by P . When g = f ,
the preference relation represents the ranking of probability-possibility sets given the action
embodied by f .
We introduce the axioms. The first two axioms are quite standard.
Axiom 1 (Order) The preference relation % is complete and transitive.
Axiom 2 (Act Continuity) For every P ∈ P and f, g, h ∈ F , if (P, f)  (P, g)  (P, h),
then there exist α and β in (0, 1) such that
(P, αf + (1− α)h)  (P, g)  (P, βf + (1− β)h).
The third axiom states that the preference over lotteries is independent of information
sets and is nondegenerate. When a lottery is given regardless of states of the world,
information about their likelihood is irrelevant. Also, we exclude the case in which the DM
is indifferent between all lotteries.
Axiom 3 (Outcome Preference) (i) For every P,Q ∈ P and l ∈ ∆∗(X), (P, l) ∼ (Q, l),
and (ii) there exist P ∈ P and l,m ∈ ∆∗(X) such that (P, l)  (P,m).
For probability {p} ∈ P and act f ∈ F , define the induced distribution over outcomes
by
l(p, f) =
∑
ω∈supp({p})
p(ω)f(ω).
The next axiom states that the evaluation of an act under precise information depends
only on its induced distribution. Notice that we do not assume the counterpart of this
for general information sets. In general, two probability-possibility set/act pairs may be
differently evaluated even if they induce the same sets of distributions over outcomes.
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Axiom 4 (Reduction under Precise Information) For every {p} ∈ P and f ∈ F ,
({p}, f) ∼ ({p}, l(p, f)).
The following two axioms are parallel to those in Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989).
Axiom 5 (c-Independence) For every f, g ∈ F , l ∈ ∆∗(X), λ ∈ (0, 1) and P ∈ P ,
(P, f) % (P, g) =⇒ (P, λf + (1− λ)l) % (P, λg + (1− λ)l)
Axiom 6 (Uncertainty aversion): For every f, g ∈ F , λ ∈ (0, 1) and P ∈ P ,
(P, f) ∼ (P, g) =⇒ (P, λf + (1− λ)g) % (P, f)
The next axiom states that if one act is preferable to another under every element of
the information set, the ranking is unchanged under the whole set.
Axiom 7 (Dominance) For every f, g ∈ F and P ∈ P ,
({p}, f) % ({p}, g) for every p ∈ P =⇒ (P, f) % (P, g).
We show in the Appendix that this axiom, together with (Reduction under Precise
Information), implies Gilboa and Schmeidler’s monotonicity axiom.
The last axiom for the benchmark is a von-Neumann Morgenstern type independence
condition for information sets.
Axiom 8 (Information Independence) For every P, P ′, Q ∈ P , f ∈ F , and λ ∈ (0, 1),
(P, f)  (P ′, f) =⇒ (λP + (1− λ)Q, f)  (λP ′ + (1− λ)Q, f).
To interpret, consider an object ‘λ ◦ P + (1− λ) ◦Q’. Given this, the DM knows that
‘P is true with probability λ and Q is true with probability 1− λ.’ Suppose the DM is to
evaluate the two objects λ ◦ P + (1 − λ) ◦ Q and λP ′ ◦ +(1 − λ) ◦ Q in choosing an act.
Then, the difference between them is only in P and P ′ which are true ‘with probability λ’.
It is intuitive that the ranking of these should depend only on the ranking of P and P ′,
and the common information set Q being true ‘with probability 1− λ’ should not matter.
We explain why the axiom permits the above interpretation, by arguing how the DM
identifies the object λ ◦P + (1− λ) ◦Q with λP + (1− λ)Q. The argument consists of two
steps.
First, the DM is indifferent between λ ◦ P + (1 − λ) ◦ Q and ‘{λ ◦ p + (1 − λ) ◦ q :
p ∈ P, q ∈ Q}.’ When the latter is given, the DM knows it is possible that p is true with
probability λ and q is true with probability 1− λ, for each p ∈ P and q ∈ Q.
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λ ◦ P + (1− λ) ◦Q
λ
1− λ
p1
p2
q1
q2
{λ ◦ p+ (1− λ) ◦ q : p ∈ P, q ∈ Q}
λ
1− λ
λ
1− λ
λ
1− λ
λ
1− λ
p1
q1
p1
q2
p2
q1
p2
q2
λP + (1− λ)Q
λp1 + (1− λ)q1
λp1 + (1− λ)q2
λp2 + (1− λ)q1
λp2 + (1− λ)q2
∼ ∼
Figure 1: Information Independence
There are two kinds of uncertainty here. One is about outcome of randomization, which
is risk, and the other is about ultimate realization of true probability law. We assume that
the DM is indifferent in the order of these two uncertainties (see the left half of Figure 1).
Second, compare {λ◦p+(1−λ)◦q : p ∈ P, q ∈ Q} and λP+(1−λ)Q. The former is the
set of compound probabilities, and the latter is that of their reduced ones. We assume that
the DM is indifferent in the reduction of compound probabilities. That is, she is indifferent
in the timing of resolution of risk, which is assumed in the standard theory (see the right
half of Figure 1).
Thus, we deduce that the DM views three objects λ◦P+(1−λ)◦Q, {λ◦p+(1−λ)◦q : p ∈
P, q ∈ Q} and λP +(1−λ)Q to be the same, and that the axiom allows the interpretation
discussed above.
Theorem 1 The preference relation % satisfies Axioms 1 to 8 if and only if there exists a
function U : P ×F → R which represents % and a mixture-linear and continuous function
u : ∆(X)→ R and a mapping ϕ : P → P such that
U(P, f) = min
p∈ϕ(P )
∑
ω∈Ω
u(f(ω)) p(ω)
where ϕ satisfies
1. (Selection): ϕ(P ) ⊂ P for every P ∈ P ,
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2. (Mixture-linearity): ϕ(λP + (1 − λ)Q) = λϕ(P ) + (1 − λ)ϕ(Q) for every P,Q ∈ P
and λ ∈ [0, 1],
Moreover, u is unique up to positive linear transformations and ϕ is unique.
We purposely kept as close as possible to the original axioms of Gilboa and Schmeidler
(1989). In particular, we kept their two key axioms (c-Independence) and (Uncertainty
Aversion). We will argue in the next section that the latter can be replaced by a more ex-
plicit representation of the agent’s attitude toward imprecision of the available information.
(Dominance) and (Independence) are more or less orthogonal to the rest of the axioms, in
the sense that they are used only to put some discipline on the ϕ function. It might be
worth mentioning that (Independence) does not imply (c-Independence).
3 Imprecision aversion
In this Section, we take advantage of the setting developed so far to give a new foundation
for the uncertainty aversion axiom, showing that it is implied by an axiom of aversion
toward imprecision. The latter compares an act under two different probability-possibility
settings and states that the decision maker always prefers the more precise information.
We therefore have to define a notion of imprecision on sets of probability distributions. The
most natural definition would be that P is more precise than Q whenever P ⊂ Q. This
is actually the definition proposed by Wang (2003). However, this definition turns out to
be much too strong. Indeed, the idea behind the notion of aversion toward imprecision is
that an imprecision averse decision maker should always prefer a more precise information,
whatever the act under consideration. Consider an act f for which the worst outcome
is obtained, say, in state 1. Then, Wang’s notion of precision would force the decision
maker to prefer ({(1, 0, . . .)}, f), that is, putting probability one on the worst outcome to
(∆({1, 2}), f), that is, being totally uncertain about the state; a feature of the axiom which
is very unlikely and unappealing.
On the other hand, it is clear that a set being more precise than another has something to
do with set inclusion. The following definition restricts the inclusion condition to some sets
of probability distributions that are comparable in some sense, exactly as the comparison
of two distributions in terms of risk focusses on distributions that have the same mean.
Definition 1 Let P,Q ∈ P . Say that P is conditionally more precise than Q if
• P ⊂ Q and,
• there exists a partition (E1, . . . , En) of S such that
(i) ∀p ∈ P , ∀q ∈ Q, p(Ei) = q(Ei) for all i = 1, . . . , n,
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(ii) co{p(.|Ei); p ∈ P} = co{q(.|Ei); q ∈ Q} for all i = 1, . . . , n.
Note that this notion is very weak in the sense that it is very incomplete. For instance, an
n-dimensional simplex cannot be compared through this definition with any of its subsets.
Indeed, two sets P and Q, ordered by set inclusion, can be compared only if there exists
a partition of the state space on which they agree and have precise probabilities (item (i)
of the definition), and furthermore, conditionally on each cell of this partition, they give
the same information (item (ii) of the definition). This means that the extra information
contained in P is about some correlation between what happens in one cell Ei with what
happens in another cell Ej. Said differently, the extra information is orthogonal to the
“initial” probabilistic information, reflected in the fact that the cells of the partition have
precise probabilities attached to them.
Take for instance
Q =
{(
p,
1
2
− p, q, 1
2
− q
)
|p ∈
[
0,
1
2
]
, q ∈
[
0,
1
2
]}
and consider
Pα =
{(
p,
1
2
− p, q, 1
2
− q
)
|p ∈
[
0,
1
2
]
, q ∈
[
0,
1
2
]
, |q − p| ≤ α
}
where α ∈ [0, 1
4
].
One obviously has Pα ⊂ Pα′ for all α′ ≥ α, and P1/4 = Q.
Furthermore, {{1, 2}, {3, 4}} is a partition of the state space such that ∀p ∈ P , ∀q ∈ Q,
p(Ei) = q(Ei) since p({1, 2}) = q({1, 2}) = 12 , p({3, 4}) = q({3, 4}) = 12 , ∀p ∈ Pα, ∀q ∈ Q.
It is also easily checked that the set of probabilities conditional on {1, 2} is the same when
computed starting from Pα and from Q. The same is true for conditionals with respect
to {3, 4}. Thus, the two requisite of the definitions are met and we can assert that Pα is
conditionally more precise than Q. The nature of the extra information that is present in
Pα is maybe clearest for α = 0. In that case, one has q = p and the extra information
that is present in P0 is a strong correlation between the different cells of the partition.
More generally, we can look at upper and lower probabilities for events according to Pα
and Q. We know they agree on the partition {{1, 2}, {3, 4}}. One can also check that
the upper and lower probabilities on the events {1, 3} and {2, 4} are the same for the two
sets (0 and 1 respectively). However, the lower and upper probability of events {2, 3} and
{1, 4} do differ for the two sets. One has, with obvious notation, p
α
({2, 3}) = 1/2− α and
p¯α({2, 3}) = 1/2 + α while q({2, 3}) = 0 and q¯({2, 3}) = 1, and similarly for event {1, 4}.
The fact that p
α
> q and p¯α < q¯, is another way to see that Pα is more precise than Q.
We can now state our axiom.
Axiom 9 (Aversion toward Imprecision) Let P,Q ∈ P be such that P is conditionally
more precise than Q, then for all f ∈ F , (P, f)  (Q, f).
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pi
pj
qi
qj
∼
qi(s˜1) = αpi(s1)
qi(s˜2) = (1− α)pi(s1)
qi(s˜2n−1) = αpi(sn)
qi(s˜2n) = (1− α)pi(sn)
f(s1)
g(s1)
f(sn)
g(sn)
qj(s˜1) = αpj(s1)
qj(s˜2) = (1− α)pj(s1)
qj(s˜2n) = (1− α)pj(sn)
f(s1)
g(s1)
f(sn)
g(sn)
qj(s˜2n−1) = αpj(sn)
(f(s1), α; g(s1), 1− α)
(f(sn), α; g(sn), 1− α)pj(sn)
pj(s1)
pi(s1)
pi(sn) (f(sn), α; g(sn), 1− α)
(f(s1), α; g(s1), 1− α)
·
···
··
·
·· ···
Figure 2: Decomposition Indifference
Remark 1 Assume Theorem 1 and (Aversion toward Imprecision) hold. Then, for any
P,Q ∈ P such that P is conditionally more precise than Q, ϕ(P ) ⊆ ϕ(Q).
To fully exploit this axiom we need an extra axiom, which embeds some mild invariance
property.
Axiom 10 (Decomposition Indifference) Let f, g, h ∈ F and P,Q ∈ P . If
• h(ω) = f(ω+1
2
) if ω is odd, and h(ω) = g(ω
2
) if ω is even and,
• Q = {q|∃p ∈ P s.th. q(ω) = αp(ω+1
2
) if ω is odd and q(ω) = (1−α)p(ω
2
) if ω is even}
for some α ∈ [0, 1], then (P, αf + (1− α)g) ∼ (Q, h)
The act (P, αf + (1 − α)g) can be interpreted by saying that a state s is determined,
according to some unknown probability p(s) that belongs to P . Then, once the state is
realized, a roulette lottery or a coin flip takes place with odds α : (1−α). As illustrated on
figure 2, the act (Q, h) can then be seen as “collapsing” this roulette lottery in the prob-
ability distribution that determines the state. Said differently, the sate now incorporates
whether the coin toss ended up heads or tails. Each state is now split in two: state s is split
into (state s, heads) and (state s, tails). Thus, the axiom says, this operation is neutral for
the decision maker as it does not modify the timing of the process: uncertainty first and
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then risk. In spirit, this axiom is very similar to the usual reduction of compound lottery
axiom.
Theorem 2 Under (Decomposition Indifference) and (Independence), (Aversion toward
Imprecision) implies (Uncertainty Aversion).
4 Contraction representation: Axiomatic foundation
In this section we provide an axiomatic characterization of the contraction representation.
The contraction representation is characterized by a stronger invariance axiom and an
additional continuity axiom. The invariance condition roughly says that the DM’s attitude
toward information should not change under some transformations of the state space (and
probability simplex) that do not change attitude toward any imprecise information. This
is interpreted as a requirement for a sophisticated attitude toward imprecise information.
Recall that for each S ∈ S, ∆(S) is a compact subset of the Euclidian space R|S|, and
P(S) is a compact metric space with regard to the Hausdorff metric.
For each S ∈ S, let ψ : ∆(S)→ ∆(S) be such a transformation, and let ψ˜ : F → F be
the transformation of acts associated with ψ. Transformation ψ is assumed to satisfy
({p}, f) % ({q}, f)⇒ ({ψ(p)}, ψ˜(f)) % ({ψ(q)}, ψ˜(f)).
for every p, q ∈ ∆(S) and f ∈ F . Then the axiom takes the form that for every S ∈ S,
every P,Q ∈ P(S) and f ∈ F ,
(P, f) % (Q, f)⇒ (ψ(P ), ψ˜(f)) % (ψ(Q), ψ˜(f)).
We take such a class of transformations as a subclass of bistochastic matrices, that
are stochastic generalization of permutations. An |S| × |S|-matrix Π is S-bistochastic if
it is nonnegative and
∑
ω∈S Πωω′ = 1 for each ω
′ ∈ S, and ∑ω′∈S Πωω′ = 1 for each
ω ∈ S. For an S-bistochastic matrix Π and f ∈ F , define the transformed act Πf ∈ F by
(Πf)(ω) =
∑
ω′∈S Πωω′f(ω
′) for each ω ∈ S, and (Πf)(ω) = f(ω) for each ω /∈ S.
Any bistochastic matrix may be expressed as a convex combination of permutation
matrices (see Birkoff (1946)). In that sense, it is a stochastic generalization of permutation.
We restrict attention to a subclass of bistochastic matrices that do not change attitude
toward any precise information.
Definition 2 A bistochastic transformation Π is S-unitary if for every p, q ∈ ∆(S) and
f ∈ F ,
({p}, f) % ({q}, f) =⇒ ({Πp},Πf) % ({Πq},Πf).
Denote the set of all S-unitary transformations by T (S).
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The following lemma shows that the class of unitary transformation is non-empty and
characterized as a conjunction of bistochastic transformation and similarity transformation.
Lemma 1 Assume axioms 1 to 4 and 8. Then, any bistochastic transformation Π is S-
unitary if and only if there exists λ ≥ 0 such that ‖Πp − Πq‖S = λ‖p − q‖S for any
p, q ∈ ∆(S), where ‖ · ‖S denotes the Euclidian norm in R|S|.
We state the axiom.
Axiom 11 (Invariance to Unitary Transformations): For every S ∈ S, any Π(S) ∈ T (S),
f ∈ F and P,Q ∈ P ,
(P, f) % (Q, f) =⇒ (ΠP,Πf) % (ΠQ,Πf).
To interpret, suppose that the DM prefers P to Q given f . Then under axioms 1 to 4
and 8, Πf induces the same ranking of probabilities in the new simplex as f does in the
original one. That is, for any p ∈ P and q ∈ Q,
({p}, f) % ({q}, f) =⇒ ({Πp},Πf) % ({Πq},Πf),
and
({q}, f) % ({p}, f) =⇒ ({Πq},Πf) % ({Πp},Πf).
Thus in the new probability simplex when given Πf , ΠP and ΠQ play the same roles as
P and Q do in the original one when given f . Therefore, it is intuitive that the ranking of
information sets is unchanged, which leads to the ranking (ΠP,Πf) % (ΠQ,Πf).
We also consider a continuity axiom with regard to probability-possibility sets.
Axiom 12 (Information Continuity): For every S ∈ S, f ∈ F and P ∈ P(S), the sets
{Q ∈ P(S) : (Q, f) % (P, f)} and {Q ∈ P(S) : (P, f) % (Q, f)} are closed with regard to
the Hausdorff metric.
Now we provide the contraction representation in which the subjective set of priors is
obtained by (i) solving for the ‘center’ of the probability-possibility set, and (ii) shrinking
the set toward the center to a degree given by preference. The ‘center’ is the Steiner point.
Imagine that a vector v is drawn from the unit sphere around the origin according to the
uniform distribution. Then the Steiner point of set P , denoted by s(P ), is the expected
maximizer of pv over p ∈ P .
More formally, fix S ∈ S and let e = ( 1|S| , · · · , 1|S|) and V = {v ∈ RS : (v − e)e =
0, ‖v− e‖ = 1} be the |S| − 2 dimensional unit sphere around e. For P ∈ P(S), its Steiner
point is defined by
s(P ) =
∫
V
argmax
p∈P
〈p, v − e〉 µ(dv)
where µ is the uniform distribution over V .2
2Multiplicity of maximizers inside the integral does not matter since uniform distribution is non-atomic.
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Example 1 Steiner point of a segment is its midpoint.
Example 2 Steiner point of a polytope is the weighted average of its vertices, in which
the weight for each vertex is proportional to its outer angle.
Example 3 When a probability-possibility set is given as the core of a lower probability
(convex capacity), its Steiner point coincides with the Shapley value of the lower probability.
This is not surprising since in the domain of convex capacities Shapley value is the unique
single-valued selection of the core that satisfies mixture independence and permutation
invariance.
We state the contraction representation result.
Theorem 3 The preference relation % satisfies Axioms 1 to 8, and 11 if and only if we
have the representation as in Theorem 1 with the additional property that for every S ∈ S,
and P ∈ P(S)
ϕ(P ) = (1− ε){s(P )}+ ε P
with ε ∈ [0, 1] that is unique.
Notice that the rate ε is constant for every probability-possibility set with finite support.
5 Comparative imprecision aversion
One of the advantage of our setting is that it allows a clean separation between imprecision
neutrality and the absence of imprecision. The latter is a feature of the information the
decision maker possesses, while imprecision neutrality is characterized by the fact that the
decision maker subjective set of priors is reduced to a singleton, i.e., even though faced
with imprecise information, the decision maker behaves as a subjective expected utility
maximizer. In this Section, we characterize a notion of comparative imprecision aversion.
5.1 Definition and characterization
In line with the notion of comparative risk aversion, one can define comparative imprecision
aversion by saying that a decision maker b is more averse toward imprecision if whenever
he prefers an act under a singleton probability-possibility set over the same act under a
general probability-possibility set, so does decision maker a. Furthermore, one would like
to separate out this attitude toward imprecision from the traditional attitude toward risk.
In order to do that, one has to define carefully the set of acts for which the definition
applies.
A fairly weak notion is the following:
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Definition 3 Let a and b be two preference relations defined on P ×F . Suppose there
exist two prizes, x¯ and x in X such that both a and b strictly prefer x¯ to x. We say that
b is more averse to bet imprecision than a if for all E ⊂ S, P ∈ P , and {p} ∈ P ,
({p}, x¯Ex) a [a](P, x¯Ex)⇒ ({p}, x¯Ex) b [b](P, x¯Ex)
In this definition, the comparison bears only on bets.
Theorem 4 Assume Ω = N. Let a and b be two preference relations defined on P×F ,
satisfying Axioms 1 to 8 as well as Axiom 10. Then, the following assertions are equivalent:
(i) b is more averse to bet imprecision than a,
(ii) for all P ∈ P , ϕa(P ) ⊂ ϕb(P ).
Remark 2 In Theorem 4, one uses (Decomposition Indifference) to be able to “duplicate”
information sets, which is why we need countably infinitely many states.
Remark 3 Under the representation Theorem 3, a decision maker b who is more averse
to bet imprecision than a decision maker a will indeed have εb > εa.
This notion of aversion to imprecision ranks preferences that do not necessarily have
the same attitudes toward risk. This is of particular interest in applications if one wants
to study the effects of risk aversion and imprecision aversion separately. For instance,
one might want to compare portfolio choices of two agents, one being less risk averse
but more imprecision averse than the other. This type of comparison cannot be done if
imprecision attitudes can be compared only among preferences that have the same risk
attitude, represented by the utility function. To the best of our knowledge, there is no
available result in the literature that achieves this separation of the characterization of
comparative ambiguity or imprecision attitudes from risk attitudes.
5.2 Imprecision premium
We define here a notion of imprecision premium which captures how much an agent is
“willing to lose” when betting on an event in order to be in a setting that has no imprecision.
More precisely, consider a preference relation  and let x¯ and x be two prizes in X such
that x¯  x. For any event E ⊂ S, let qE be a probability distribution such that (P, x¯Ex) ∼
(
{
qE
}
, x¯Ex). Under Axioms 1 to 6, such a probability distribution exists and is independent
of x¯ and x, since (P, x¯Ex) ∼ (
{
qE
}
, x¯Ex) if, and only if, q
E(E) = minp∈ϕ(P ) p(E).
Definition 4 For any P ∈ P and for any event E ⊂ S, let
• the absolute imprecision premium, piA(E,P ) be defined by s(P )(E)− qE(E),
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• the relative imprecision premium, piR(E,P ) be defined by piA(E,P )
s(P )(E)−Minp∈P p(E) whenever
s(P )(E) 6=Minp∈Pp(E).
The absolute premium is thus the mass of probability on the good event that the agent
is willing to forego in order to act in precise situation rather than with the imprecise
probability-possibility set P . The precise reference in that definition is rather naturally
taken to be the Steiner point of the set P . An analogy with the risk premium can be
drawn as follows: s(P )(E) plays the role of the expectation of the risky prospect while
qE(E) plays the role of the certainty equivalent.
Theorem 5 Let a and b be two preference relations defined on P×F , satisfying axioms
1 to 8 and 10. Then, the following assertions are equivalent:
(i) b is more averse to bet imprecision than a,
(ii) for all P ∈ P , ϕa(P ) ⊂ ϕb(P ).
(iii) for all P ∈ P , for all event E ⊂ S, piAb (E,P ) ≥ piAa (E,P ).
Hence, as in the theory of risk aversion, one can capture by a single number the compar-
ison of imprecision attitude. Furthermore, one can also define a notion of constant relative
imprecision premium, again in a similar fashion as for the relative risk premium.
Definition 5 A decision maker is said to have constant relative imprecision premium θ if
for any P ∈ P and for any event E ⊂ S such that s(P )(E) 6=Minp∈Pp(E), piR(E,P ) = θ.
Note that the functional form axiomatized in Section 4 satisfies constant relative im-
precision premium. Actually, the converse is true under Axiom 10.
Theorem 6 Consider a decision maker satisfying Axioms 1 to 8 and 10. The following
assertions are equivalent:
(i) the decision maker has constant relative imprecision premium ε,
(ii) for all P ∈ P , ϕ(P ) = εP + (1− ε) {s(P )}.
This Theorem therefore gives another foundation for the functional form of Theorem
3, based this time not on invariance properties, but rather on constant relative attitude
toward imprecision.
6 Example
We develop in this section a simple application of our analysis to portfolio choice that is
similar in spirit to Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukerji (2005)’s. There are three assets, a,
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b, and c. The following table gives the payoff matrix
s 1 2 3 4
a k k k k
b b¯ b¯ 1 1
c c¯ 1 1 c¯
We put the following restrictions on the parameters: c¯ > b¯ > k > 1. The information
available is given by the set
Pα =
{(
p,
1
2
− p, q, 1
2
− q
)
|p ∈
[
0,
1
2
]
, q ∈
[
0,
1
2
]
, |q − p| ≤ α
}
where α ∈ [0, 1
2
]. Hence, the probability of {1, 2} is precise, equal to 1/2 and similarly for
{3, 4}. α is a measure of how “imprecise the set is”: a higher α corresponds to a higher
degree of imprecision. Taken with this information, the assets have a natural interpretation:
asset a is the safe asset, b is the “risky” asset as its payoffs are measurable with respect to
the partition {{1, 2}, {3, 4}}, and asset c is the “imprecise” asset.
We consider a decision maker with CARA utility function u(w) = −e−γw, where γ is
the coefficient of absolute risk aversion. The transformed set is given by:
F (Pα) =
{(
p,
1
2
− p, q, 1
2
− q
)
|p ∈
[
1
4
− θ, 1
4
+ θ
]
, q ∈
[
1
4
− θ, 1
4
+ θ
]
, |q − p| ≤ α
}
θ is the parameter of imprecision aversion, in the sense that it gives the rate of con-
traction for the simplex ∆({1, 2}). For simplicity, we assume that the constraint on the
distance between p and q is the same in the transformed set as in the information set (it
is easy to generalize to a constraint of the type |q − p| ≤ β(α) with β(.) increasing in α.)
To make things interesting, we assume that θ ≥ α/2, so that the constraint |q − p| ≤ α is
effective in the computation of the optimal portfolio (although see Remark 4 below.)
The decision maker has one unit of wealth that he has to allocate among the three
assets. We allow for short sales. We consider successively three cases depending on which
assets are actually available, the first case being the benchmark situation of choice between
the safe and the risky asset.
Case 1: choice between safe and risky asset.
This case is the usual one and one gets that b? = 1
γ(1−b¯) log
(
k−1
b¯−k
)
, which is naturally
independent from the parameters θ and α. Under the parameter restrictions, it is easy to
see that increasing risk aversion decreases holding of the risky asset.
Case 2: choice between safe and imprecise asset.
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The problem to be solved here is to find the optimal amount of the imprecise asset, i.e.,
the solution to: maxcminpi∈F(Pα)−
[
(pi(1) + pi(4))e−γ((1−c)k+cc¯) + (pi(2) + pi(3))e−γ((1−c)k+c)
]
,
or rewritten in terms of p and q:
max
c
min
F(Pα)
− [(p+ 1/2− q))e−γ((1−c)k+cc¯) + (1/2− p+ q)e−γ((1−c)k+c)]
As long as c > 0, −e−γ((1−c)k+cc¯) > −e−γ((1−c)k+c) and hence the decision maker will
“use” the probability in F(Pα) that put the highest weight on the event {2, 3} and lowest
weight on {1, 4}. Hence, one wants to minimize p − q. Let therefore q = 1/4 + θ and
p = 1/4 + θ − α.3 Solving for the optimal solution yields
c? =
1
γ(c¯− 1) log
(
(c¯− k)(1/2− α)
(k − 1)(1/2 + α)
)
One can check that c? is positive as conjectured if (k − 1)/(c¯− k) < (1/2− α)/(1/2 + α).
Here, the comparative statics with respect to γ works as in the single risky asset case. What
is more interesting, although intuitive, is that the imprecise asset holding is decreasing in
α: an increase in imprecision of the information provided reduces the amount of asset the
decision maker wants to hold. Note also that imprecise asset holding does not depend, in
this example, on the imprecision aversion parameter θ (as long as θ ≥ α/2).
Case 3: choice among all three assets.
This is the more general case and is a bit more tedious to study. Let’s write us the
utility of the portfolio in state s. As long as b > 0 and c > 0, one has that u1 > u2 and
u4 > u3 and furthermore, u4−u3 > u1−u2. Hence, the minimizing probability that belongs
to F(Pα) is given by p = 1/4 + θ − α and q = 1/4 + α.
Let K = (c¯−k)(b¯−1)
(c¯−b¯)(k−1) . Under our assumption, K > 1. Then, the optimal solution can be
written:
b? =
1
γ(b¯− 1) log
[
(K − 1)1/4− θ + α
1/4 + θ
]
c? =
1
γ(c¯− 1) log
[
c¯− b¯
b¯− 1
(
(K − 1)1/4− θ
1/4 + θ
+
1/4 + θ − α
1/4− θ + α
)]
Under some further (uninteresting) restrictions on the parameters, one can check that
b? > 0 and c? > 0 as conjectured when picking the minimizing probability distribution.
One can thus perform comparative statics exercises. As α increases, that is as the
information available is less precise, the decision maker will hold more of the risky asset
and less of the imprecise asset. Thus, there is some form of substitution among assets
3Actually, it is easy to see that this is not the only possible choice of a minimizing probability. q =
1/4− θ+α and p = 1/4− θ would also minimize p− q. The optimal solution however does not depend on
which one of these probability distributions is used, as the objective function depends only on p− q.
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as imprecision increases. This suggests that the observed under diversification of decision
makers’ portfolio might be a consequence of how imprecision affects different assets. More
specifically, consider parameter values such that b? > c? (in our toy example this is the
case for a large range of parameter values.) Note that if one were to ignore the effect of
uncertainty on asset holding by wrongly setting α = 0, the predicted holding of the risky
asset would be lower than b? while the predicted holding of the imprecise asset would be
higher than c?, i.e., the predicted holdings would appear to be more diversified. Thus if
one fails to identify which assets are affected by imprecision, one could overestimate the
predicted weight of these assets in the optimal portfolio.
Finally, it is also easy to show that the holdings of the risky as well as the imprecise
assets are decreasing in the risk aversion parameter γ, as well as with the imprecision
aversion parameter θ. This might help explaining phenomenon like the equity premium
puzzle, as imprecision aversion essentially reinforces the effect of risk aversion. Interestingly,
these two very tentative hints as to how to account for the under-diversification puzzle and
the equity premium puzzle in our model are linked to two different parameters (imprecision
and imprecision aversion) and could therefore be incorporated in the same model.
Remark 4 The comparative static exercises performed were done under the assumption
that θ ≥ α/2. If this were not the case, then one can show that the minimizing probability
used to evaluate the portfolio returns does not depend on α (when looking at the choice
among all three assets.) Hence, over the full range of parameters there is a discontinuity
in how imprecision affects holding of the risky and imprecise assets.
Remark 5 Note that all the action in this example does not take place because of the
non-differentiability introduced by the min operator, as for instance in Epstein and Wang
(1994) or Mukerji and Tallon (2001). Rather, the comparative statics were done at points
where, locally, the decision maker behaves like an expected utility maximizers. More pre-
cisely, in usual maxmin expected utility models, decision makers look like expected utility
maximizers away from the 45 degree line and there is no sense in which one can change the
set of priors as there is no explicit link with the available information. In our model, there is
some leverage in that respect even away from the kinks, as we have a way to link changes in
the set of priors to changes in available information and to changes in imprecision attitudes.
Thus, although non smooth, our model remains tractable in applications.
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Appendix
Proof for the Extended Multiple-priors Representation
Necessity of the axioms is routine. We show sufficiency.
Fix an information set P ∗. By Outcome Preference, we can define the preference over
lottery outcomes %∗ by
l %∗ m if (P ∗, l) % (P ∗,m).
By Act Continuity and c-Independence, %∗ satisfies the condition for the standard
expected utility a` la von-Neumann and Morgenstern. Denote the vNM utility by u, which
is mixture-linear and unique up to positive linear transformations.
We extend this to the variable information setting where information is precise.
Lemma 2 There exists a mixture linear and continuous function u : ∆∗(X) → R such
that ({p}, f) % ({q}, g) if and only if∑
ω∈supp({p})
u(f(ω)) p(ω) ≥
∑
ω∈supp({q})
u(g(ω)) q(ω).
Moreover, u is unique up to positive linear transformations.
Proof. By Reduction under Precise Information and mixture-linearity of u, we obtain
({p}, f) % ({q}, g) ⇔ ({p}, l(p, f)) % ({q}, l(q, g))
⇔ (P ∗, l(p, f)) % (P ∗, l(q, g))
⇔ l(p, f) %∗ l(q, g)
⇔ u(l(p, f)) ≥ u(l(q, g))
⇔
∑
ω∈supp({p})
u(f(ω)) p(ω) ≥
∑
ω∈supp({q})
u(g(ω)) q(ω).
We extend the above representation to the entire domain. For this purpose we first
prove a monotonicity condition.
Lemma 3 (Monotonicity) For any P ∈ P and f, g ∈ F ,
(P, f(ω)) % (P, g(ω)) for every ω ∈ supp(P )
implies (P, f) % (P, g).
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Proof. Take P ∈ P and let (P, f(ω)) % (P, g(ω)) for every ω ∈ supp(P ). Under the
previous result, this implies ({p}, f) % ({p}, g) for every p ∈ P . By Dominance, we get
(P, f) % (P, g).
Lemma 4 Given u, there exists a unique continuous function U : P × F → R such that:
1. (P, f) % (Q, g) if and only if U(P, f) ≥ U(Q, g),
2. U({p}, f) =∑ω∈supp(P ) u(f(ω)) p(ω) for every {p} ∈ P and f ∈ F
Proof. Define U : P × F → R by
U(P, f) ≡ u(l)
such that (P, f) ∼ (P, l) ∼ (P ∗, l).
Monotonicity and Act Continuity guarantee the existence of such l, and c-Independence
guarantee the uniqueness of such l up to payoff.
Lemma 5 Given u and U , there exists a unique function I : P × Ru → R, where Ru is
the range of u, such that
1. I(P, u ◦ f |supp(P )) = U(P, f) for any P ∈ P and f ∈ F .
2. I(P, c1) = c for every c ∈ {u(l) : l ∈ ∆∗(X)}.
Proof. By Monotonicity, I : P ×Ru → R is well-defined by
I(P, u ◦ f |supp(P )) ≡ U(P, f).
Monotonicity again delivers I(P, c1) = c.
The following three lemmata can be shown by applying the argument in Gilboa and
Schmeidler (1989)
Lemma 6 For any P ∈ P , x ∈ R|supp(P )|, c ∈ R and λ ≥ 0,
I(P, λx) = λI(P, x).
Lemma 7 For any P ∈ P , x ∈ R|supp(P )|, c ∈ R and λ ∈ [0, 1],
I(P, λx+ (1− λ)c1) = λI(P, x) + (1− λ)c.
Lemma 8 For any P ∈ P , the function I(P, ·) is quasi-concave.
Thus, we can apply the Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) argument so that we obtain
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Lemma 9 For any P ∈ P , there exists a unique closed (hence compact) convex set ϕ(P )
such that
I(P, x) = min
p∈ϕ(P )
∑
ω∈supp(P )
x(ω) p(ω)
for every x ∈ R|supp(P )|.
Proof. Fix P ∈ P . Then, I(P, ·) satisfies the condition of GS. Thus, there is a closed
convex set ϕ(P ) ∈ P such that
I(P, x) = Φ
 min
p∈ϕ(P )
∑
ω∈supp(P )
x(ω) p(ω);P

where Φ(·;P ) is a monotone transformation depending on P .
Recall that I(P, c1) = c for any c. Therefore, Φ (c;P ) = c for any c, which implies
Φ(·, P ) is an identity map, and it this true for any P ∈ P .
Selection Property
For later use, we prove an alternative dominance condition.
Lemma 10 (Set Dominance): For every f ∈ F , P ∈ P and {p} ∈ P ,
({p}, f) % ({p′}, f) for every p′ ∈ P ⇒ ({p}, f) % (P, f),
and
({p′}, f) % ({p}, f) for every p′ ∈ P ⇒ (P, f) % ({p}, f).
Proof. Without loss, we just prove the first statement. Suppose ({p}, f) % ({p′}, f) for
every p′ ∈ P . Since ({p}, f) ∼ ({p}, l(p, f)) ∼ ({p′}, l(p, f)) follows from Reduction under
Precise Information and Outcome Preference, we have ({p′, l(p, f)}) % ({p′}, f) for every
p′ ∈ P . By Dominance, (P, l(p, f)) % (P, f). By Reduction under Precise Information and
Outcome Preference again, (P, l(p, f)) ∼ ({p}, l(p, f)) ∼ ({p}, f). Therefore, ({p}, f) %
(P, f).
Lemma 11 For every P ∈ P , ϕ(P ) ⊂ P .
Proof. Suppose ϕ(P ) * P . Then, there exists f ∈ F such that
U(P, f) = min
p∈ϕ(P )
∑
ω
u(f(ω)) p(ω)
< min
p∈P
∑
ω
u(f(ω)) p(ω)
= U({p}, f),
where ({p}, f) % ({p}, f) for every p ∈ P . However, this contradicts (Set Dominance).
Mixture Linearity
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Lemma 12 Under Information Independence: for every P,Q ∈ P , f ∈ F and λ ∈ [0, 1],
U(λP + (1− λ)Q, f) = λU(P, f) + (1− λ)U(Q, f).
Proof. Let {p}, {q} ∈ P be such that (P, f) ∼ ({p}, f) and (Q, f) ∼ ({q}, f), respectively.
Then, repeated application of Information Independence delivers
(λP + (1− λ)Q, f) ∼ (λ{p}+ (1− λ)Q, f) ∼ (λ{p}+ (1− λ){q}, f)
Since (λ{p}+(1−λ){q}, f) = λU({p}, f)+(1−λ)U({q}, f) is true for precise information,
we obtain the claim.
Lemma 13 For every P,Q ∈ P and λ ∈ [0, 1], ϕ(λP + (1− λ)Q) = λϕ(P ) + (1− λ)ϕ(Q).
Proof. By construction,
U(λP + (1− λ)Q, f) = min
p∈ϕ(λP+(1−λ)Q)
∑
ω
u(f(ω)) p(ω).
for any f ∈ F .
By mixture-linearity of U over P , the above is equal to
λU(P, f) + (1− λ)U(Q, f) = λ min
p∈ϕ(P )
∑
ω
u(f(ω)) p(ω) + (1− λ) min
p∈ϕ(Q)
∑
ω
u(f(ω)) p(ω)
= min
p∈λϕ(P )+(1−λ)ϕ(Q)
∑
ω
u(f(ω)) p(ω)
for any f ∈ F . By uniqueness of ϕ(·), we obtain the result.
Proof of Theorem 2
Let f, g ∈ F and P ∈ P and assume (P, f) ∼ (P, g). Define h by h(s) = f( s+1
2
) if s is
odd, and h(s) = g( s
2
) if s. For any α ∈ [0, 1], define Q(α) = {q|∃p ∈ P s. th. q(s) =
αp( s+1
2
) if s is odd and q(s) = (1− α)p( s
2
) if s is even}.
By (Decomposition Indifference) (Q(1), h) ∼ (P, f) and (Q(0), g) ∼ (P, g). By assump-
tion, (P, f) ∼ (P, g) and thus (Q(0), g) ∼ (P, f). By (Independence) for any λ ∈ [0, 1],
(λQ(1) + (1− λ)Q(0), h) ∼ (P, f).
Now, Q(λ) is conditionally more precise than λQ(1) + (1− λ)Q(0). Indeed, (i) Q(λ) ⊂
λQ(1) + (1 − λ)Q(0) and (ii) take as a partition of the state space {E1, E2, . . . } where
En = {2n − 1, 2n}, then the condition holds. Hence, (Q(λ), h)  (P, f) and therefore,
since (Decomposition Indifference) implies that (Q(λ), h) ∼ (P, λf + (1 − λ)g), we have:
(P, λf + (1− λ)g)  (P, f)
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Proof of the Contraction Representation result
For a while we fix S ∈ S. We first prove continuity of ϕ in P (S).
Lemma 14 The mapping ϕ : P(S) → P(S) is continuous with respect to the Hausdorff
metric.
Proof. Let {P n} be a sequence in P(S) converging to P ∈ P(S). Because P(S) is
compact, it is without loss of generality to assume that {ϕ(P n)} is convergent. Suppose
ϕ∗ ≡ limn→∞ ϕ(P n) 6= ϕ(P ). Then there exists f ∈ F such that
U(P, f) = min
p∈ϕ(P )
∑
ω∈S
u(f(ω)) p(ω)
> min
p∈ϕ∗
∑
ω∈S
u(f(ω)) p(ω)
= lim
n→∞
min
p∈ϕ(Pn)
∑
ω∈S
u(f(ω)) p(ω)
= lim
n→∞
U(P n, f),
which is a contradiction to Information Continuity.
Lemma 15 For any bistochastic matrix Π, the following two statements are equivalent:
(i) There exists λ ∈ [0, 1] such that ‖Πp−Πq‖ = λ‖p− q‖ for any p, q ∈ ∆(S), where ‖ · ‖
denotes the Euclidian norm;
(ii) There exists λ ∈ [0, 1] such that ΠtΠ = λI + 1−λ|S| E, where I is the identity matrix and
E is a matrix in which all the entries are 1.
Proof. Let e = ( 1|S| , · · · , 1|S|).
(i) ⇒ (ii): Take any p, q ∈ ∆(S). Then,
〈Πp,Πq〉 = 2
〈
Πp+Πq
2
− e, Πp+Πq
2
− e
〉
− 1
2
〈Πp− e,Πp− e〉 − 1
2
〈Πq − e,Πq − e〉
+ 〈Πp, e〉+ 〈Πq, e〉 − 〈e, e〉
Since Πe = e and 〈Πp, e〉 = 〈p, e〉 = 1|S| for any p, by assumption the right-hand-side of the
above equality becomes
λ
[
2
〈
p+ q
2
− e, p+ q
2
− e
〉
− 1
2
〈p− e, p− e〉 − 1
2
〈q − e, q − e〉+ 〈p, e〉+ 〈q, e〉 − 〈e, e〉
]
+(1− λ) [〈p, e〉+ 〈q, e〉 − 〈e, e〉]
= λ〈p, q〉+ (1− λ)/|S|
Thus, we obtain
〈Πp,Πq〉 = ptΠtΠq
= λ〈p, q〉+ (1− λ)/|S|
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for any p, q ∈ ∆(S). Pick p = δω, q = δω′ where δω and δω′ are probabilities degenerated
on ω, ω′, respectively. Then, for all the column vectors Π1, · · · ,Π|S|, we obtain
ΠtωΠω′ = λ when ω 6= ω′
ΠtωΠω = λ+ (1− λ)/|S|.
(i) ⇐ (ii): By the converse argument of the above.
We now prove Lemma 1.
Proof. (⇐): Take any ω ∈ S and let eω be the vector which assigns 1 on the ω-th
coordinate and 0 on the others. Without loss of generality, we assume that eω is obtained
as the payoff vector of some act fω, that is, eω = u ◦ fω.
Now take p, q ∈ ∆(S) such that (p − q)teω = 0. This means pω = qω. Without loss
of generality, let pω = qω = 0. By assumption, (p − q)tΠtΠeω = 0. Let Γ = ΠtΠ. Then,∑
ω′ 6=ω(pω′ − qω′)Γω′ω = 0. For any ω′, ω′′ 6= ω, take pω′ = 1 and qω′′ = 1. Then, we have
Γω′ω = Γω′′ω. This is true for any ω and ω
′, ω′′ 6= ω. Since Γ = ΠtΠ is a symmetric matrix,
we obtain that all the off-diagonal entries of Γ are the same. Therefore, all the diagonal
entries of Γ are the same.
Finally, we show that the diagonal entries cannot be smaller than the off-diagonal
entries. Let Γd be the diagonal entry and Γnd be the off-diagonal entry. Let p
ε
ω be the vector
which assigns 1−(|S|−1)ε on the ω-th coordinate and ε on the others, where 0 < ε < 1|Ω|−1 .
Then, (δω − pεω)teω = (|S| − 1)ε > 0. Then, (δω − pεω)tΓeω = (|Ω| − 1)ε(Γd−Γn) ≥ 0, which
implies Γd ≥ Γnd.
(⇒): Obvious.
Lemma 16 For any P ∈ P(S) and Π ∈ T (S), ϕ(ΠP ) = Πϕ(P ).
Proof. Suppose ϕ(ΠP ) * Πϕ(P ). Then, there is y ∈ RS such that
min
p∈Πϕ(P )
∑
ω∈S
y(ω) p(ω) > min
p′∈ϕ(ΠP )
∑
ω∈S
y(ω) p′(ω)
By taking y = Πx, both sides are written as
min
p∈ϕ(P )
∑
ωinS
(Πx)(ω) (Πp)(ω) > min
p′∈ϕ(ΠP )
∑
ω∈S
(Πx)(ω) p′(ω) (∗)
By homogeneity with respect to x, without loss of generality, we can set x = u ◦ f and
for some f ∈ F . Take p∗ ∈ argminp∈ϕ(P )
∑
ω x(ω) p(ω). Since∑
ω∈S
(Πx)(ω) (Πp)(ω) = λ
∑
ω∈S
x(ω) p(ω) +
1− λ
|S|
∑
ω∈S
x(ω),
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we have p∗ ∈ argminp∈ϕ(P )
∑
ω(Πx)(ω) (Πp)(ω). Thus, the left hand side of (∗) is equal
to U({Πp∗},Πf). On the other hand, the right hand side of (∗) is U(ΠP,Πf). Thus,
U({Πp∗},Πf) > U(ΠP,Πf)
By definition of p∗, we have U({p∗}, f) = U(P, f). This contradicts to the Invariance
to Unitary Transformations.
We similarly obtain a contradiction for the case ϕ(ΠP ) + Πϕ(P ).
Let 1 = (1, · · · , 1) and e = 1|S|1. For later use, we show the lemma below.
Lemma 17 Let F : ∆(S)→ ∆(S) be a mixture-linear mapping satisfying F (e) = e. Then
there is a unique bistochastic matrix Π such that F (p) = Πp for every p ∈ ∆(S).
Proof. Given such F , define Π by Πij = Fi(δj) where δj is a probability which assigns unit
mass on state j ∈ S. By mixture linearity, Π represents F .
Suppose there are two matrices Π and Π′ which represent F . If Πij 6= Π′ij for some
i, j ∈ Ω, this leads to Fi(δj) = Πij 6= Π′ij = Fi(δj), a contradiction. Thus Π is unique.
If Πij < 0 for some i, j ∈ S, this leads to Fi(δj) < 0, which is a contradiction.
For any j ∈ S, Πδj = (Πij)i∈S ∈ ∆(S). Therefore,
∑
i∈S Πij = 1 for each j ∈ S.
Since Πe = e, for each i ∈ N , 1|S|
∑
j∈S Πij =
1
|S| . Therefore,
∑
j∈S Πij = 1 for each
i ∈ S.
Now define ϕ∗ : P(S)− {e} → P(S)− {e} by
ϕ∗(K) = ϕ(K + {e})− {e}
Lemma 18 For anyK ∈ P(S)−{e} and λ ≥ 0 with λK ∈ P(S)−{e}, ϕ∗(λK) = λϕ∗(K).
Proof. The case of λ = 0 or 1 is obvious. Let λ ∈ (0, 1). Then,
ϕ∗(λK) = ϕ(λK + {e})− {e}
= ϕ(λ(K + {e}) + (1− λ){e})− {e}
= λϕ(K + {e}) + (1− λ)ϕ({e})− {e}
= λϕ(K + {e}) + (1− λ){e} − {e}
= λ(ϕ(K + {e})− {e})
= λϕ∗(K).
The case of λ > 1 is immediate from the above.
Let He be the |S| − 1 dimensional linear subspace of RS which is orthogonal to e. Let
Ke be the family of compact convex subsets of He, endowed with the Hausdorff metric. By
the above lemma, we extend ϕ∗ to Ke. This preserves continuity in the Hausdorff metric.
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Lemma 19 For any K,K ′ ∈ Ke, ϕ∗(K +K ′) = ϕ∗(K) + ϕ∗(K ′). In particular, ϕ∗(K +
{z}) = ϕ∗(K) + {z}.
Proof. Take sufficiently small λ > 0, then λK, λK ′ ∈ P(S)− {e}. By homogeneity,
ϕ∗(K +K ′) =
2
λ
ϕ∗
(
λK + λK ′
2
)
Then, we have
ϕ∗
(
λK + λK ′
2
)
= ϕ
(
λK + {e}
2
+
λK ′ + {e}
2
)
− {e}
=
1
2
ϕ(λK + {e}) + 1
2
ϕ(λK ′ + {e})− {e}
=
ϕ(λK + {e})− {e}
2
+
ϕ(λK ′ + {e})− {e}
2
=
1
2
ϕ∗(λK) +
1
2
ϕ∗(λK ′)
=
λ
2
ϕ∗(K) +
λ
2
ϕ∗(K ′),
which gives the result.
For each Π ∈ T (S), define a mapping TΠ : ∆(S)− {e} → ∆(S)− {e} by
TΠ(x) = Π(x+ e)− e.
Since x + e ∈ ∆(S) implies Π(x + e), the mapping indeed satisfies TΠ(x) ∈ ∆(S) − {e}.
By nature of Π, we have (i) TΠ(λx) = λTΠ(x) for any λ with λx ∈ ∆(S) − {e}, (ii)
TΠ(x + y) = TΠ(x) + TΠ(y), and (iii) there exists λΠ ∈ (0, 1) such that ‖TΠ(x)‖ = λΠ‖x‖
for every x ∈ ∆(S)− {e}. By (i), we can extend TΠ to the whole linear subspace He.
We say that a linear transformation G is a sub-similarity if G(∆(S)−{e}) ⊂ ∆(S)−{e}
and there exists λG ∈ (0, 1] such that ‖G(x)‖ = λG‖x‖ for any x ∈ He.
Conversely to the above, any sub-similarity G : He → He has a corresponding unitary
transformation. For G, define FG : ∆(S)→ ∆(S) by
FG(p) = G(p− e) + e.
Then, it is easy to see that FG takes values in ∆(S) and is mixture linear and FG(e) = e.
By the previous lemma, it has a representation by a doubly stochastic matrix ΠG and
FG(p) = Π(p). Since FG satisfies (iii), ΠG is an T (S).
Now we show that ϕ∗ is equivariant in sub-similarities.
Lemma 20 For any sub-similarity G : He → He, ϕ∗(GK) = Gϕ(K).
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Proof. By homogeneity of ϕ∗, without loss of generality we can take K ∈ P(S)−{e}. By
the above lemma G has a corresponding unitary transformation ΠG and G(x) = ΠG(x +
e)− e for any x ∈ ∆(S)− {e}.
Then,
ϕ∗(G(K)) = ϕ(G(K) + {e})− {e}
= ϕ(ΠG(K + {e})− {e}+ {e})− {e}
= ϕ(ΠG(K + {e}))− {e}
= ΠGϕ(K + {e})− {e}
= G(ϕ(K)).
A linear transformation I : He → He is called isometry if ‖I(x)‖ = ‖x‖. Let I be
the set of isometries. For any isometry I ∈ I, its positive scaler multiplication λI where
λ > 0 is chosen so that λI(∆(S)− {e}) ⊂ ∆(S)− {e} is a sub-similarity. Conversely, any
isometry is obtained from a sub-similarity by reversing the above procedure.
By homogeneity of ϕ∗, we obtain
Lemma 21 The mapping ϕ∗ is equivariant in isometries. That is, for any isometry I ∈ I,
ϕ∗(I(K)) = I(ϕ∗(K)).
The |S| − 1 dimensional Euclidian space R|S|−1 is the image of the linear subspace He
by some isometry. Let J : He → R|S|−1 be such isometry. All the relevant operations are
preserved under isometry. Let K|S|−1 be the space of compact convex subsets of R|S|−1.
The space K|S|−1 is also the image of Ke by the isometry. Define ϕ∗∗ : K|S|−1 → K|S|−1 by
ϕ∗∗(K) = J(ϕ∗(J−1(K))).
Then, ϕ∗∗ is continuous, additive and equivariant in isometries in R|S|−1 and translations,
and satisfies ϕ∗∗(K) ⊂ K for any K ∈ K|S|−1.
Let W = {w ∈ R|S|−1 : ‖w‖ = 1} be the |S|−2 dimensional unit sphere. For a compact
convex set K ∈ K|S|−1, its Steiner point is defined by
s∗∗(K) =
∫
W
argmax
p∈K
〈p, w〉 ν(dw)
where ν is the uniform distribution over W .4
4Schneider (1974) has adopted a different definition of Steiner point, but it is equivalent to the current
definition, which follows from Theorem 9.4.1 in Aubin and Frankowska (1990).
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Lemma 22 There exist ε ≥ 0 and δ ≥ 0 such that
ϕ∗∗(K) = ε [K − s∗∗(K)] + δ [−K + s∗∗(K)] + {s∗∗(K)}.
for every K ∈ K|S|−1.
Proof. Case 1 |S| = 1, 2: Obvious.
Case 2 |S| = 3: Since image of a segment is its subsegment, we can apply Theorem 1.8
(b) in Schneider (1974) so that we obtain
ϕ∗∗(K) = εT1 [K − s∗∗(K)] + δT2 [−K + s∗∗(K)] + {s∗∗(K)}
with ε ≥ 0, δ ≥ 0 and T1, T2 being some two dimensional rotation matrices.
Consider a segment with midpoint 0. Since its image is its subsegment, it must be the
case that (T1, T2) = (1, 1) or (1,−1) or (−1, 1) or (−1,−1). Thus, without loss of generality
ϕ∗∗(K) = ε [K − s∗∗(K)] + δ [−K + s∗∗(K)] + {s∗∗(K)}
Case 3 |S| ≥ 4: Since ϕ∗∗(K) ⊂ K for any K ∈ K|Ω|−1, the image of any segment is its
subsegment. Thus we can apply Theorem 1.8 (b) in Schneider (1974) so that we obtain
ϕ∗∗(K) = ε [K − s∗∗(K)] + δ [−K + s∗∗(K)] + {s∗∗(K)}
with ε ≥ 0, δ ≥ 0.
Finally, we show ε ∈ [0, 1] and δ = 0. Since ϕ∗(K) ⊂ K for any K, ε cannot exceed 1.
Now consider a family of triangles
Kθ = {(x1, x2, 0, · · · , 0) ∈ R|S|−1 : x2 ≤ cos θ
sin θ
x1, x2 ≥ −cos θ
sin θ
x1, x1 ≤ sin θ}
indexed by 0 < θ < pi
2
. Then we have s∗∗(Kθ) = (pi−θpi sin θ, 0, 0, · · · , 0). Let x1(Kθ) =
maxx∈ϕ∗∗(Kθ) x1. We get x1(Kθ) =
pi−θ
pi
sin θ + ε θ
pi
sin θ + δ pi−θ
pi
sin θ. Since ϕ∗∗(Kθ) ⊂ Kθ,
this cannot exceed sin θ. Since sin θ is positive, we can divide both sides of x1(Kθ) ≤ sin θ
by sin θ and by arranging we get
δ ≤
θ
pi
1− θ
pi
(1− ε).
Since this is true for any θ ∈ (0, pi
2
), we obtain δ = 0.
Thus
ϕ∗∗(K) = ε [K − s∗∗(K)] + {s∗∗(K)}
with ε ∈ [0, 1]. Since Steiner point and every relevant operation are preserved by isometry,
we obtain
ϕ(P ) = ε [P − s(P )] + {s(P )}.
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Constancy of ε with regard to S
Let εS be the rate corresponding to S. When S ⊂ S ′, since P ∈ P(S) implies P ∈ P(S ′),
we must have εS = εS′ . For every S, S
′, since εS = εS∪S′ , and εS′ = εS∪S′ , we obtain the
desired claim.
Proof for Comparative Imprecision Aversion
Theorem 4
Let us first prove the following lemma
Lemma 23 Let  be a preference relation defined on P ×F , satisfying Axioms 1 to 8 as
well as Axiom 10. For all P,Q ∈ P and α ∈ [0, 1], such that
Q = {q|∃p ∈ P s.th. q(ω) = αp(ω + 1
2
) if ω is odd and q(ω) = (1− α)p(ω
2
) if ω is even}
we have
ϕ(Q) = {q|∃p ∈ ϕ(P ) s.th. q(ω) = αp(ω + 1
2
) if ω is odd and q(ω) = (1−α)p(ω
2
) if ω is even}
Proof.
Let P,Q ∈ P and α ∈ [0, 1], be such that
Q = {q|∃p ∈ P s.th. q(ω) = αp(ω + 1
2
) if ω is odd and q(ω) = (1− α)p(ω
2
) if ω is even}
We first prove that
ϕ(Q) ⊆ Q∗ = {q|∃p ∈ ϕ(P ) s.th. q(ω) = αp(ω + 1
2
) if ω is odd and q(ω) = (1−α)p(ω
2
) if ω is even}
Assume that there exists p∗ ∈ ϕ(Q) such that p∗ /∈ Q∗. Since Q∗ is a convex set, using a
separation argument, we know that there exists a function φ : Ω→ R such that ∫ φdp∗ <
minp∈Q∗
∫
φdp. Since supp(Q) is a finite set, there exist numbers a, b with a > 0, such
that ∀ω ∈ supp(Q), (aφ(ω) + b) ∈ u(∆(X)). Then, for all ω ∈ supp(Q) there exists
y(ω) ∈ ∆(X) such that u(y(ω)) = aφ(ω) + b. Define h ∈ F by h(ω) = y(ω) for all
ω ∈ supp(Q), h(ω) = δx for all ω ∈ Ω\supp(Q), where x ∈ X.
Then define f, g ∈ F by f(ω) = h(2ω−1) and g(ω) = h(2ω). We have that supp(Q∗) ⊆
supp(Q) and therefore
min
p∈Q∗
∑
ω∈Ω
u(h(ω)) p(ω) = min
p∈ϕ(P )
∑
ω∈Ω
u(αf(ω) + (1− α)g(w)) p(ω)
while
min
p∈Q∗
∑
ω∈Ω
u(h(ω)) p(ω) >
∑
ω∈Ω
u(h(ω)) p∗(ω) ≥ min
p∈ϕ(Q)
∑
ω∈Ω
u(h(ω)) p(ω)
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and thus
(P, αf + (1− α)g)  (Q, h)
which contradicts Axiom 10.
The same kind of proof permits to show that Q∗ ⊆ ϕ(Q).
[(i) ⇒ (ii)] Let P ∈ P and assume that ϕa(P ) 6⊂ ϕb(P ), i.e., there exists p∗ ∈ ϕa(P )
such that p∗ 6∈ ϕb(P ). Using a separation argument, there exists a function φ : Ω→ R such
that
∫
φdp∗ < min
p∈ϕb(P )
∫
φdp. Note that we can choose by normalization ua and ub such that
ua(x¯) = ub(x¯) > ua(x) = ub(x). Since supp(P ) is a finite set, there exist numbers k > 0 and
`, such that for all ω ∈ supp(P ), kφ(s) + ` ∈ [ua(x), ua(x¯)]. Denote supp(P ) = {ω1, .., ωn}.
Let αi =
kφ(ωi)+`−ua(x)
ua(x¯)−ua(x) and let suppose w.l.o.g that α1 ≤ α2 ≤ ... ≤ αn.
Let f 0 ∈ F such that f 0(ωi) = αiδx¯ + (1 − αi)δx for all i = 1, ..., n and f 0(ω) = x for
all s ∈ Ω\supp(P ).
Then define f i ∈ F for i = 1, ..., n by:
• for all j = 1, .., i, for all ω ∈
{
2iωj −
∑
h=0,..,i−1 2
h, ..., 2iωj −
∑
h=0,..,i−j−1 2
h − 1
}
,
f i(ω) = x¯
• for all j = i+ 1, .., n, for all ω ∈
{
2iωj −
∑
h=0,..,i−1 2
h, ..., 2iωj − 1
}
, f i(ω) = x¯
• for all j = i+ 1, .., n, f i(2iωj) = αj−αi1−αi δx¯ +
(1−(αj−αi)
1−αi δx
• for all other ω, f i(ω) = x
Let
• Q1 = {q|∃p ∈ P s.th. q(ω) = α1p(ω+12 ) if ω is odd and q(ω) = (1 − α)p(ω2 ) if ω is
even}
• for j = 2, ..., n, Qj = {q|∃p ∈ Qj−1 s.th. q(ω) = α1p(ω+12 ) if ω is odd and q(ω) =
(1− α)p(ω
2
) if ω is even}
Let
• p∗1 be such that p∗1(ω) = α1p(ω+12 ) if ω is odd and p∗1(ω) = (1− α)p(ω2 ) if ω is even
• for j = 2, ..., n, p∗j be such that p∗j(ω) = α1p∗j−1(ω+12 ) if ω is odd and p∗j(ω) =
(1− α)p∗j−1(ω
2
) if ω is even.
By lemma 23, one can check that:
33
• for h = a, b
min
p∈ϕh(P )
∑
ω∈Ω
uh(f
0(ω)) p(ω) = min
p∈ϕh(Q1)
∑
ω∈Ω
uh(f
1(ω)) p(ω)
and
∑
ω∈Ω
uh(f
0(ω)) p∗(ω) =
∑
ω∈Ω
uh(f
1(ω)) p∗1(ω)
• for h = a, b, for i = 2, ..., n
min
p∈ϕh(Qi−1)
∑
ω∈Ω
uh(f
i−1(ω)) p(ω) = min
p∈ϕh(Qi)
∑
ω∈Ω
uh(f
i(ω)) p(ω)
and
∑
ω∈Ω
uh(f
i−1(ω)) p∗i−1(ω) =
∑
ω∈Ω
uh(f
i(ω)) p∗i(ω)
• for i = 1, ..., n, p∗i ∈ ϕa(Qi)
Therefore,
min
p∈ϕb(P )
∑
ω∈Ω
ub(f
0(ω)) p(ω) = min
p∈ϕb(Qn)
∑
ω∈Ω
ub(f
n(ω)) p(ω) >∑
ω∈Ω
ub(f
0(ω)) p∗(ω) =
∑
ω∈Ω
ub(f
n(ω)) p∗n(ω)
while ∑
ω∈Ω
ua(f
0(ω)) p∗(ω) =
∑
ω∈Ω
ua(f
n(ω)) p∗n(ω) ≥
min
p∈ϕa(P )
∑
ω∈Ω
ua(f
0(ω)) p(ω) = min
p∈ϕa(Qn)
∑
ω∈Ω
ua(f
n(ω)) p(ω)
However, fn is of the form x¯Ex.
Therefore, we have
({p∗n}, x¯Ex) a (Qn, x¯Ex)
while
(Qn, x¯Ex) b ({p}, x¯Ex)
which contradicts the fact that b is more averse to bet imprecision than a.
[(ii)⇒ (i)] Straightforward.
Theorem 5
[(i)⇔ (ii)] This equivalence was proved in Theorem 4.
[(ii) ⇒ (iii)] Since piAa (E,P ) = s(P )(E) − Minp∈ϕa(P )p(E) and piAb (E,P ) = s(P )(E) −
Minp∈ϕb(P )p(E), ϕa(P ) ⊂ ϕb(P ) implies that piAb (E,P ) ≥ piAa (E,P ).
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[(iii) ⇒ (i)] Consider prizes x¯ and x in X such that both a and b strictly prefer x¯ to x,
and let P ∈ P , and E ⊂ Ω. For any p, for any agent i = a, b, (x¯Ex, {p}) i [i](x¯Ex, P )
if, and only if, piAi (E,P ) ≥ []s(P )(E)− p(E). Therefore since piAb (E,P ) ≥ piAa (E,P ), this
implies that we have
(x¯Ex, {p}) a [a](x¯Ex, P )⇒ (x¯Ex, {p}) b [b](x¯Ex, P )
which completes the proof that b is more averse to bet imprecision than a.
Theorem 6
[(i)⇒ (ii)] Let P ∈ P , and p be a boundary point p of co(P ). Define:
ε = Sup {ε′|ε′ ∈ [0, 1] s.th. (ε′p+ (1− ε)s(P )) ∈ ϕ(P )} .
Then p = εp + (1 − ε)s(P ) is a boundary point of ϕ(P ) since ϕ(P ) is closed. Since it is
convex as well, there exists a function φ : S → R such that ∫ φdp = min
p∈ϕ(P )
∫
φdp.
Using the notation and definitions introduced in the proof of Theorem 4 in order to
define fn = x¯Ex, p
n, pn and Qn, we have that (fn, {pn}) ∼ (fn, Qn). Note that pn =
εpn + (1− ε)s(Qn). Thus
piR(E,Qn) =
s(Qn)(E)− pn(E)
s(Qn)(E)−Minq∈Qnq(E) ≤
s(Qn)(E)− pn(E)
s(Qn)(E)− pn(E) = ε.
If ε > ε we get a contradiction with the fact that piR(E,Qn) = ε. Therefore, for any
boundary point p of co(P ), ε (p) = Sup {ε′|ε′ ∈ [0, 1] s.th. (ε′p+ (1− ε)s(P )) ∈ ϕ(P )}
is such that ε (p) ≥ ε. Let p∗ be a boundary point of co(P ) such that ε (p∗) ≥ ε (p)
for all boundary point p of co(P ). Then, there exists a function φ : S → R such that∫
φdp∗ = min
p∈P
∫
φdp. Define p∗ = ε(p∗)p∗ + (1 − ε(p∗))s(P ) and consider now p′ ∈ ϕ(P ).
There exists a boundary point p of co(P ) and ε′ < ε(p) such that p′ = ε′p+ (1− ε′)s(P ).
Let us use again the notation and definition introduced in the proof of Theorem 4 .
Since
∫
u◦ (x¯Ex) dp∗n ≤
∫
u◦ (x¯Ex) dpn and
∫
u◦ (x¯Ex) dp∗n ≤
∫
u◦ (x¯Ex) ds(Qn), we have
that
∫
u ◦ (x¯Ex) dp∗n ≤
∫
u ◦ (x¯Ex) dp′n. Thus
∫
u ◦ (x¯Ex) dp∗n = min
r∈ϕ(Qn)
∫
u ◦ (x¯Ex) dr
while
∫
u ◦ (x¯Ex) dp∗n = min
r∈ϕ(Qn)
∫
u ◦ (x¯Ex) dr. Therefore
piR(E,Qn) =
s(Qn)(E)− q∗(E)
s(Qn)(E)−Minq∈Qnq(E) = ε (p
∗) ,
and thus ε (p∗) = ε. Hence, for all boundary point p of co(P ), ε (p) = ε which proves that
ϕ(P ) = εP + (1− ε) {s(P )} .
[(ii)⇒ (i)] Consider P ∈ P , and E ⊂ Ω such that s(P )(E) 6=Minp∈Pp(E). We have
min
p∈ϕ(P )
p(E) = ε min
p∈ϕ(P )
p(E) + (1− ε)s(P )(E),
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and therefore
piR(E,P ) =
s(P )(E)−Minp∈ϕ(P )p(E)
s(P )(E)−Minp∈ϕ(P )p(E) = ε.
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